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THE ORDINARY DISEASE EXCLUSION IN VIRGINIA'S
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT: WHERE IS IT GOING AFTER
ASHLAND OIL CO. v. BEAN?
Recoverable claims under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act are
divided into two categories: injuries by accident1 and injuries from occu-
pational diseases. 2 Occupational disease coverage has undergone signifi-
cant expansion in the past decade. Faced with society's demand and its
own desire to expand, the Industrial Commission has gradually broad-
ened its interpretation of the Act. The expansion of occupational disease
coverage has, however, been significantly hindered by the statutory com-
pensation exclusion for ordinary diseases. Uncertain as to the full effect
of this exclusion, the Commission has fluctuated between granting and
denying awards for ordinary diseases. The Commission's conflicting treat-
ment of ordinary diseases has led to general confusion regarding the law.
After a decade of silence, the Virginia Supreme Court in Ashland Oil
Co. v. Bean3 attempted to resolve the conflicts surrounding ordinary dis-
ease compensation. Unfortunately, the court's intervention simply com-
pounded the existing confusion.
This comment discusses the changes which led to the occupational dis-
ease expansion, the problems encountered by the Industrial Commission
in expanding such coverage, and the court's attempt to clarify the law.
Both the court's and the Commission's prevailing positions on compen-
sability of ordinary diseases are explored, as well as the changes in the
law that are likely to occur as a result of pending litigation.
I. BACKGROUND
The Virginia Workers' Compensation Act,4 first enacted in 1918,5 pro-
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-1 to -9 (Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983). For an exhaustive
analysis of Virginia's workers' compensation addressing "injury by accident," see Evans,
Ray, & Steele, Recovery for Accidental Injuries Under the Virginia Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, 14 U. RICH. L. Rav. 659 (1980).
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-46 to -53 (Repl. VoL 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
3. 225 Va. 1, 300 S.E.2d 739 (1983) (per curiam).
4. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-1 to -163 (Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
5. 1918 Va. Acts ch. 400. The Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act adopted virtually
verbatim the Indiana Act. See Huffer Bros. v. Smith, 148 Va. 220, 227, 138 S.E. 474, 476
(1927) (for the text of the current Indiana Act, see IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-1-1 to 22-3-10-3
(Burns 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1983)). At the same time the judicial construction of the Indiana
Act was also considered adopted. Big Jack Overall Co. v. Bray, 161 Va. 446, 171 S.E. 686
(1933). For this reason, Virginia courts have often relied on Indiana decisions in construing
its own act. See Basham v. Lowe, 176 Va. 485, 493-94, 11 S.E.2d 638, 641-42 (1940); Cohen
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vides compensation to workers injured on the job." The theory of workers'
compensation is that employment injuries should be treated as business
expenses and borne by the employer.' Prior to the enactment of workers'
compensation laws, the employee had difficulty recovering against an em-
ployer since his only cause of action was based on common-law negli-
gence.' Under workers' compensation, the employee agrees to surrender
his legal rights against the employer in exchange for compensation secur-
ity.' Thus, both parties benefit from this mutual exchange.10
A. The Growth and Development of Occupational Disease Coverage
Historically, disease coverage has lagged far behind accident coverage."
Since its inception, workers' compensation has compensated employees
for on-the-job accidents, 2 but until recently employees have not received
compensation for diseases contracted in the workplace. It was not until
more than 400 workers in West Virginia died from a single incident of
silicosis, an occupational disease, that many states passed statutes to ex-
pand their compensation coverage.
13
Fearing that a broad occupational disease coverage would turn into a
general workers' health insurance, 14 many states"5 followed the English
lead'6 and adopted a schedule-type coverage. This type of coverage lists
v. Cohen's Dept. Store, 171 Va. 106, 109-10, 198 S.E. 476, 477 (1938).
6. See, e.g., Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 211, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1941).
7. Humphries v. Boxley Bros., 146 Va. 91, 96, 135 S.E. 890, 894 (1926). See also Turnage
v. Northern Va. Steel Corp., 336 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that financial risks of
accidental personal injuries inherent in a project should be borne by that project).
8. In a negligence action the employer had the "'unholy trinity' of common law de-
fenses-contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule" against an
employee's action. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971). As a
result, few actions were successful against the employer. Id.
9. In accepting a statutorily fixed amount of compensation, the employee gives up his
right to sue his employer for full damages. The employer surrenders his right to the de-
fenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow servant rule, but gains re-
lief from full damage liability. Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 521-22, 65 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1951).
10. Id.
11. 1B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKME.N'S COMPENSATION § 41.20 (Repl. Vol. 1982 &
Cum. Supp. 1983). Reasons for this lag included the fear of substituting no-fault liability for
injuries potentially based on fault liability; uncertainty that this occupational disease prob-
lem could not be better handled under general health insurance legislation; apd the lack of a
common-law origin for occupational disease legislation. Id.
12. Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 521, 65 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1951).
13. In 1936, more than 400 workers on the Gauley Bridge Tunnel in West Virginia died
from silicosis. Note, Indiana Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act: Silicosis, 14 IND. L.J.
542, 542-43 (1939).
14. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
15. See generally 1B A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 41.10 & nn.6-7. For a good overview of
the fifty states' occupational disease laws, see 4 id., table 2A.
16. Note, supra note 13, at 543 n.2.
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and defines the diseases considered occupational.
17
Gradually, as workers' compensation expanded to provide a more com-
prehensive coverage for workers, the limiting schedule-type coverage was
replaced. Today, all states have general coverage which compensates for
any disease peculiar to the occupation.' s
B. Coverage Under Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act
Coverage under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act is divided
into two areas: injuries by accidents 9 and injuries by occupational dis-
eases.20 A claimant must assert one of these two theories as grounds for
compensation. Although each theory is defined and governed by its own
code section,2 many of the disease definitions, tests, and burdens are di-
rectly borrowed from the "injury by accident" statute.22 Thus, to fully
understand the limitations on occupational disease coverage, it is useful
to look first at the "injury by accident" coverage.
17. Under the schedule, the following diseases and conditions were deemed to be "occu-
pational": anthrax; asbestosis; cataract of the eyes because of exposure to heat and glare of
molten glass or radiant rays; compressed air illness; conjunctivitis or retinitis; cellulitis; der-
matitis; epitheliomatous cancer or ulceration of the skin or eye; glanders; infection or in-
flammation of the skin, eyes, or oral or nasal cavities; infections or contagious diseases con-
tracted in the course of employment in, or in immediate connection with, a hospital or
sanitarium; poisoning; radium disability; silicosis; and ulceration because of chrome com-
pounds or caustic chemicals. VA. CODE § 1887(2g) (Supp. 1944).
18. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-275 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-84) (" 'occupational
disease' means a disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and
due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such"). The states either
repealed their old schedules, as Virginia did, 1970 Va. Acts ch. 470, or added a "catch-all"
phrase to their existing schedules. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 72-438 (Supp. 1983) (After listing
12 diseases considered to be occupational, the schedule states: "Recognizing that additional
toxic or harmful substances or matter are continually being discovered and used or misused,
the above enumerated occupational diseases are not intended to be exclusive.").
19. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-1 to -9 (Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983). In 1982, there
were 43,837 "injury by accident" claims filed with the Virginia Industrial Commission. (If
minor medical claims, which resulted in no work loss, are included, the total number in-
creases to 184,535.) Telephone interview with Ronald Umble, Systems Analyst, Virginia In-
dustrial Commission in Richmond, Va. (Oct. 11, 1983).
20. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-46 to -53 (Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983). In 1982, 543
occupational disease claims were filed with the Virginia Industrial Commission. Telephone
interview with Ron Umble, supra note 19. The Industrial Commission is a three-person
body which reviews awards and findings made by the eight-deputy Commissioners. See VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-10 to -13 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
21. "Injuries by accident" are governed by VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
Whereas occupational diseases are under VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-46 to -53 (Repl. Vol. 1980 &
Cum. Supp. 1983).
22. Cf. the "arising out of" definition, the "just as probable cause" rule, and the burden of
proof necessary to establish a successful claim under VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-7 and 65.1-46
(Repl. Vol. 1980).
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1. "Injury By Accident" Coverage
a. Elements
The Virginia Code identifies three elements that must be proven before
compensation under "injury by accident" is awarded: First, the injury
must be by accident; second, it must arise out of the employment; and
third, it must occur in the course of the employment.2 3
"By accident" requires that an injury be received at a specifically iden-
tifiable time and place, and by a specifically identifiable accident. 4 Al-
though the term "injury by accident" has generally been given a broad
interpretation,2 5 the courts have not expanded it sufficiently to compen-
sate work-related injuries that are partly accidents and partly diseases,
such as cumulative injuries.
26
An injury must also "arise out of the employment." The words "arising
out of" refer to the "origin or cause of the injury."27 The Virginia Su-
preme Court, relying on the definition outlined by the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court in In re McNicol,2 s has held that an injury arises
out of the employment "when there is apparent to the rational mind
upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the
resulting injury. '29 To prove this causal connection, the court and the
23. Unless the context otherwise requires, "injury" and "personal injury" mean only in-
jury by accident, or occupational disease as hereinafter defined, arising out of and in
the course of the'employment and do not include a disease in any form, except when
it results naturally and unavoidably from either of the foregoing causes.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
24. Aistrop v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 181 Va. 287, 293, 24 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1943), afl'd,
183 Va. 23, 31 S.E.2d 297 (1944).
25. Aistrop, 181 Va. at 292, 24 S.E.2d at 548. See also Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hosey, 208
Va. 568, 159 S.E.2d 633 (1968) (claimant was engaged in door-to-door sales when her knee
gave out; the court interpreted the "by accident" requirement to include an unusual or un-
expected event).
26. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
27. Hosey, 208 Va. at 571, 159 S.E.2d at 635-36. The expressions "arising out of" and "in
the course of" employment are used conjunctively and not synonymously. Id. at 571, 159
S.E.2d at 635. Both must be satisfied before compensation is awarded. See Graybeal v.
Board of Supervisors, 216 Va. 77, 80, 216 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1975). See also Note, Workmen's
Compensation and Welfare, 61 VA. L. REv. 1862, 1863 (1975).
28. 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913).
29. Id. The court added:
Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the
work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole
situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment,
then it arises "out of" the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly
be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes
from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the
employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to
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Commission look primarily to the persuasiveness of the available medical
evidence.3 0 Medical evidence includes doctor's testimony,3 physical ex-
amination of the claimant, 32 medical history of the claimant,33 and hospi-
tal charts and records of the claimant.34 Compensation is awarded only
when there is sufficient evidence linking the physical injury to the work
activity.
The injury must also occur "in the course of the employment." This
term "refers to continuity of time, space, and circumstance .... This re-
quirement [is] satisfied by a showing of an unbroken course beginning
with work and ending with injury .... -5 The requirement is met when
the claimant shows that an accident took place in ihe course of employ-
ment, in a place where the employee reasonably should have been, and
while he was reasonably fulfilling duties of his employment.36
In an "injury by accident" claim, the claimant has the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident arose out of and
in the course of the employment. 37 If the evidence shows that it is just as
the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not inde-
pendent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or
expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected
with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
Id. at 499, 102 N.E. at 697, quoted with approval in Connor v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 208-09,
123 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1962). See also Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1970-71
Workmen's Compensation, 57 VA. L. REv. 1520, 1523-24 (1971); Thirteenth Annual Survey
of Virginia Law: Torts, 54 VA. L. REv. 1649, 1657-58 (1968).
30. "To ascertain the mechanism or cause of injury we look to the medical evidence, and
here we find from the uncontradicted opinions that the work activity was the producing
cause of injury." Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hosey, 208 Va. 568, 570, 159 S.E.2d 633, 634
(1968). See also D.W. Mallory & Co. v. Phillips, 219 Va. 845, 252 S.E.2d 319 (1979) (medical
evidence failed to establish causal connection between claimant's heart attack and the work
activity); Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 173 S.E.2d 833 (1970) (no medical
evidence was introduced to link claimant's back injury to his job); Carter v. Hercules Pow-
der Co., 182 Va. 282, 28 S.E.2d 736 (1944) (contradictory medical evidence did not establish
that claimant's cataract was causally related to employment). But see Blue Diamond Coal
Co. v. Pannell, 203 Va. 49, 122 S.E.2d 666 (1961) (medical evidence linked lung carcinoma to
employment hazards); Maness v. Miss Virginia, Inc., 55 Op. Indus. Comm'n 235 (1973)
(medical evidence related the contraction of byssinosis to the manufacturing of garments);
Wells v. Gwaltney, Inc., 49 Op. Indus. Comm'n 331, 332-33 (1967) (medical evidence linked
brucellosis to employment).
31. Tomko, 210 Va. at 700, 173 S.E.2d at 836.
32. Rust Eng'g Co. v. Ramsey, 194 Va. 975, 979, 76 S.E.2d 195, 196-97 (1953).
33. Derby v. Swift & Co., 188 Va. 336, 340, 49 S.E.2d 417, 418-19 (1948).
34. Id. at 339-40, 49 S.E.2d at 419.
35. Graybeal v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Va. 77, 80, 216 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1975).
36. Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938). Since occupa-
tional diseases may develop gradually, the claimant is not required to show a definite time,
place, and circumstance of disease exposure. Nevertheless, the claimant must demonstrate
that the disease is traceable to employment as the proximate cause. Van Geuder v. Com-
monwealth, 192 Va. 548, 557, 65 S.E.2d 565, 570-71 (1951).
37. For an excellent summary of the claimant's burden of proof in an "injury by accident"
1983]
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probable that the injury is the result of a noncompensable cause, such as
smoking,"8 or the natural development of an unrelated disease,39 then the
burden of proof has not been sustained, and compensation will be
denied.40
b. Aggravation of Pre-Existing Infirmity by Accident4 1
Another component of an "injury by accident" claim which may assist
in understanding disease claims is the aggravation of an employee's pre-
existing infirmity. When an accident aggravates or accelerates such a con-
dition, compensation will be awarded,42 because the employer takes the
claim, see Norfolk & Washington Steamboat Co. v. Holladay, 174 Va. 152, 5 S.E.2d 486
(1939). For a synopsis of the claimant's burden of proof in an occupational disease claim, see
Van Geuder, 192 Va. 548, 65 S.E.2d 565 (one of the few Virginia Supreme Court cases deal-
ing with occupational diseases).
38. Adkins v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n 9, 12 (1981) (claim for byssi-
nosis denied because medical specialist was unable to determine whether the disease was
caused by cotton dust or thirty years of cigarette smoking).
39. Rust Eng'g Co. v. Ramsey, 194 Va. 975, 76 S.E.2d 195 (1953) (compensation denied
because employee's injury resulted from the progressive development of arteriosclerosis, and
not from the employment accident).
40. Id. at 979-80, 76 S.E.2d at 198. See also Bergman v. L & W Drywall, 222 Va. 30, 32,
278 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1981) (per curiam). The "just as probable" rule should not be confused
with the "two cause" rule. The latter refers to a disability which has two causes, one related
to the employment and one unrelated. Under the "two cause" rule, the claimant will be fully
compensated when it is shown that the employment contributed to the injury. See id., 278
S.E.2d at 802-03 (remanded to the Industrial Commission because the two rules were
confused).
The Industrial Commission has also denied compensation for occupational diseases under
the "just as probable" rule. See, e.g., Barrington v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 60 Op. Indus.
Comm'n 32, 32 (1982) (appeal denied); Adkins v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 60 Op. Indus.
Comm'n 9, 12 (1981); Caskey v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n 81, 84 (1981).
41. A pre-existing infirmity may be aggravated in two ways: by a specific accident or by
the general employment environment. The former is compensable as long as the accident is
work-related. The latter, however, is not usually compensable. See infra notes 98-101 and
accompanying text.
42. The Industrial Commission routinely awards compensation for injury resulting from
an accidental aggravation of a claimant's pre-existing condition. See, e.g., Smith v. Richards
Corp., 59 Op. Indus. Comm'n 280, 282 (1980) (claimant's back injury reinjured while lifting);
Nellum v. Phelps Coal & Wood Co., 53 Op. Indus. Comm'n 231, 236 (1971) (claimant's
thromboangitis obliterans aggravated by lifting in the cold). See generally lB A. LARSON,
supra note 11, §§ 37.00 to 38.83 (discussing "injury by accident," including the aggravation
of a claimant's pre-existing condition). The Virginia Supreme Court normally affirms the
Commission's compensation of an injury which is the result of an accident aggravating a
pre-existing condition. See, e.g., Lilly v. Shenandoah's Pride Dairy, 218 Va. 481, 237 S.E.2d
786 (1977) (claimant's heavy lifting in the cold aggravated heart condition); Ellis v. Com-
monwealth, 182 Va. 293, 28 S.E.2d 730 (1944) (claimant's accidental fall triggered pre-ex-
isting sarcoma); Justice v. Panther Coal Co., 173 Va. 1, 2 S.E.2d 333 (1939) (compensation
awarded when the claimant sustained a fractured pelvis which aggravated pre-existing
pneumonia and led to his death).
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employee as he finds him.43 For example, in Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Money,44 the claimant, who suffered from several serious diseases,
received an accidental injury at work.45 The accident aggravated these la-
tent diseases and ultimately led to his death. The court, affirming the
Industrial Commission's decision to award compensation, held:
As a general rule the pre-existing physical condition is immaterial if the
injury is proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in the course
of the employment. The fact that the accident of itself would not have been
sufficient to cause the injury in the absence of a pre-existing disease is no
defense, for the employer takes the employee as he finds him, and if the
accident accelerates or aggravates a pre-existing diseased condition, the in-
jured party is entitled to compensation .... 46
To be compensated, the claimant must show only that the accident ma-
terially aggravated or accelerated his pre-existing disease.4 7 Furthermore,
the accident need not be the principal cause of the disability so long as it
is a contributing factor.
48
2. Occupational Disease Coverage
Accidents are dramatic, time-definite events which are easily identifi-
able to the job. Occupational diseases, on the other hand, develop slowly
over time and have less obvious origins. 49 Consequently, it is more diffi-
cult to prove that an employee's disease is the result of his employment
so that compensation should be awarded.
The purpose of occupational disease coverage, like that of workers'
compensation generally, is to compensate a worker for wage losses sus-
tained when his disability results from an occurrence arising out of, and
43. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at § 43.
44. 174 Va. 50, 4 S.E.2d 739 (1939).
45. Claimant was suffering from pyorrhea, chronic nephritis, generalized toxemia, diabe-
tes, and thrombophlebitis of the right femoral vein when he received a compensable groin
injury. One month later claimant died of lobar pneumonia. Id. at 52-53, 4 S.E.2d at 739-40.
46. Id. at 55-56, 4 S.E.2d at 741. Compensation does not include injury from the natural
progression of a disease. Id. at 56, 4 S.E.2d at 741.
47. Lilly v. Shenandoah's Pride Dairy, 218 Va. 481, 483, 237 S.E.2d 786, 790-91 (1977);
Justice v. Panther Coal Co., 173 Va. 1, 6-7, 2 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1939).
48. Money, 174 Va. at 56, 4 S.E.2d at 741. The claimant's death did not principally result
from the groin injury, but instead from the aggravation of his pre-existing diseases.
Again substantial medical evidence is needed to link the aggravation of the pre-existing
condition to the compensable accident. Justice v. Panther Coal Co., 173 Va. 1, 3-4, 2 S.E.2d
333 , 334 (1939).
49. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARv. L. REv. 916, 921
(1980). The crucial distinction between a disease and an accident is the foreseeability of the
disease as a job-related hazard as opposed to the suddenness of the accident. 1B A. LARSON,
supra note 11, § 41.31.
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in the course of, the employment.5 0 Fearful of developing a general sys-
tem of health insurance,5 ' the Virginia legislature defined the term "occu-
pational disease" narrowly and carefully articulated what was required to
constitute an occupational disease.5 2 Like "injury by accident," the occu-
pational disease must arise out of and in the course of the employment.
The Virginia Code outlines six requirements that must be satisfied
before a disease is considered occupational in nature.
A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only if there is
apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances:
(1) A direct causal connection between the conditions under which work
is performed and the occupational disease,
(2) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a
result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment,
(3) It can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause,
(4) It does not come from a hazard to which workmen would have been
equally exposed outside of the employment,
(5) It is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of
the relation of employer and employee, and
(6) It must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the
employment and to have flowed from that source as a natural consequence,
though it need not have been foreseen or expected before its contraction."3
Although neither the Virginia Supreme Court54 nor the Industrial Com-
mission"5 has provided a detailed definition of an occupational disease,
Indiana, on whose statute Virginia based its own workers' compensation
legislation,56 has provided definitional guidelines. The Indiana Court de-
fines an occupational disease as "one which gradually develops from, and
50. For the general purpose of workers' compensation, see Burlington Mills Corp. v. Ha-
good, 177 Va. 204, 211, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1941).
51. Van Geuder v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 548, 552, 65 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1951). See also
Rust Eng'g Co. v. Ramsey, 194 Va. 975, 980, 76 S.E.2d 195, 199 (1953) (the Workmen's
Compensation Act should be liberally construed, but should not be converted into a general
form of health insurance).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
53. Id. Note the similarity between this Code section and the McNicol definition of "aris-
ing out of," supra note 29.
54. Since the Virginia Supreme Court rarely grants appeals from the Industrial Commis-
sion's decisions, see infra note 122 and accompanying text, there have been few occupational
disease cases decided by the court. Therefore, the only definition provided thus far is that in
the Code.
55. The Industrial Commission has offered this vague definition: "Whether the disease is
occupational must be determined by the peculiar characteristics of each employment and
the effect it has on the individual who suffers from that employment." Dowdy v. Black
Constr. Co., 40 Op. Indus. Comm'n 44, 46 (1958) (emphasis added).
56. See supra note 5.
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bears a direct causal connection with the conditions under which the
work is performed, and which results from an exposure occasioned by and
naturally incidental to a particular employment. 5 7 This definition con-
tains most of the elements identified by the Virginia Supreme Court as
necessary to establish a successful occupational disease claim."' A claim-
ant must prove a direct causal relation between the work conditions and
the disease, show that the disease was contracted because of employment
exposure, and trace the disease to the employment as the proximate
cause.59 It appears from the definition that a causal connection linking
the injury to the employment is more important in a successful disease
claim than it is in an accident claim.
As with "injury by accident," medical evidence"0 is vital in proving the
causative link between the disease and the work environment."' Uncon-
57. Star Publishing Co. v. Jackson, 115 Ind. App. 221, -, 58 N.E.2d 202, 203 (1944)
(original emphasis).
58. Van Geuder, 192 Va. at 556, 65 S.E.2d at 570.
59. Id. at 556-57, 65 S.E.2d at 570-71. The Industrial Commission weighs the evidence
and determines if the causal relation is established. See, e.g., Hutchens v. County of Fairfax,
60 Op. Indus. Comm'n 221 (1981) (contraction of hepatitis causally related to employment
in sewage plant); Williams v. City of Chesapeake, 57 Op. Indus. Comm'n 383, aff'd, 57 Op.
Indus. Comm'n 387 (1976) (emphysema causally connected to work as a firefighter). But see,
e.g., Hensley v. Morton Frozen Foods Div., 46 Op. Indus. Comm'n 107 (1964) (claimant
failed to sustain burden of proof that back strain was related to employment); Loftis v.
Robbins Mills, Inc., 38 Op. Indus. Comm'n 78 (1956) (varicose veins not proven to be caus-
ally related to employment).
Because of the difficulty in proving causation in occupational disease claims, Virginia has
relieved some of the burden by enacting statutory presumptions and by following the "last
injurious exposure" rule.
Under Virginia's "last injurious exposure" rule, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-50 to -52 (Repl.
Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983), an employee is not required to prove that his occupational
disease was contracted while working for any particular employer, but rather must merely
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, in whose employment he was last injuriously
exposed. See Pocahontas Fuel Co., v. Godbey, 192 Va. 845, 852-53, 66 S.E.2d 859, 864
(1951); see generally Note, supra note 27, at 1862.
Under VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-47.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983), there is a rebuttable presumption
that the death or disability of a firefighter or law-enforcement officer is causally connected
to the employment and therefore compensable as an occupational disease. See, e.g., Garri-
son v. Prince William County Bd. of Supervisors, 220 Va. 913, 919-20, 265 S.E.2d 687, 691
(1980); Berry v. County of Henrico, 219 Va. 259, 264-65, 247 S.E.2d 389, 392 (1978); Page v.
City of Richmond, 218 Va. 844, 847, 241 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1978).
60. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
61. Medical evidence illustrating that the disease arose out of the employment is neces-
sary in order to make a successful occupational disease claim. See, e.g., Hackler v. Hanes
Corp., 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n 176, 178 (1981) (a medical specialist linked claimant's chronic
shoulder pain to the repetitive movements required in her job); Sage v. Independence In-
dus., 53 Op. Indus. Comm'n 322, 323 (1971) (doctor found acute tendonitis initiated and
aggravated by repetitive wrist motions required by claimant's job). But see, e.g., Myers v.
Rockingham Poultry Mktg. Coop., 61 Op. Indus. Comm'n 310, 312 (1982), rev'g 60 Op. In-
dus. Comm'n 319 (1981) (full Commission reversed preliminary award because medical testi-
mony established only that claimant's reputured heel cord was related to work, not that it
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tradicted medical testimony tracing the illness to the occupation stands a
much greater chance of compensation than medical evidence which
merely predicts or suggests that the illness is related to the
employment.
62
II. PROBLEMS IN EXPANDING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE COVERAGE
Both by legislation and by judicial decision, Virginia has gradually fol-
lowed the nationwide trend to expand occupational disease coverage.1
3
The repeal of the occupational disease schedule,6 4 which removed statu-
tory barriers to occupational disease coverage, and the court's deference
to the Industrial Commission's decisions have afforded the Commission
greater freedom to make awards.6
Despite the national trend, the Virginia Industrial Commission has, un-
til recently, tended to favor the employer rather than the claimant.
66
However, in March of 1983, following a change in Commissioners, 67 the
Commission's alignment shifted toward the claimant. 6
was necessarily caused by it); Esque v. Giant Food, Inc., 56 Op. Indus. Comm'n 104, 105
(1975) (medical evidence indicated that the claimant was allergic to many substances, and
that exposure on the job merely aggravated her allergies).
62. Compare Fragale v. Giant of Va., Inc., 53 Op. Indus. Comm'n 100, 103 (1971) (uncon-
tested medical evidence linking the disease to the employment) with Tuck v. Roanoke Me-
morial Hosp., 52 Op. Indus. Comm'n 261, 262 (1970) (medical evidence consisting of the
attending physician's report could establish only a possible causative link between hepatitis
and the claimant's occupation as a nurse).
63. See, e.g., Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, -, 101 N.W.2d 200, 207 (1960)
(deterioration of salesperson's toe joint from standing all day held compensable as an occu-
pational disease); Brown Shoe Co. v. Fooks, 228 Ark. 815, _, 310 S.W.2d 816, 818 (1958)
(ischial bursitis from sitting held compensable). See generally 1B A. LARSON, supra note 11,
§§ 41.40, 41.70, 41.72.
64. 1970 Va. Acts ch. 470.
65. The court has declined to accept many Industrial Commission decisions on appeal.
See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
66. Interview with Andrew Edelstein, Claims Manager, Virginia Industrial Commission,
in Richmond, Va. (Sept. 20, 1983).
67. On March 31, 1983, Commissioner Thomas Miller retired. He was replaced by Wil-
liam O'Neill. Telephone interview with Lou-Ann Joyner, Clerk of the Industrial Commission
in Richmond, Va. (Oct. 11, 1983).
68. Commissioner Miller was usually the swing vote between the pro-claimant position of
Commissioner Robert Joyner and the pro-carrier position of Commissioner Charles James
(and Commissioner M. Edwards Evans who retired in 1980). See, e.g., Hatfield v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n 192, 195 (1981) (James and Miller, Comm'rs, holding for
the employer and the insurance carrier; Joyner, Comm'r, dissenting); Williams v. City of
Chesapeake, 57 Op. Indus. Comm'n 383, 387 (1976) (Joyner and Miller, Comm'rs, in favor of
the claimant; Evans, Comm'r, dissenting).
Although on the Commission only a short time, Commissioner O'Neill appears to have
departed from the middle ground occupied by former Commissioner Miller. Consequently,
the balance has tilted in favor of the claimant. See Yancy v. Holly Farms, No. 106-63-71
(Indus. Comm'n July 26, 1983), appeal granted, No. 83-1386 (Va. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1984). In
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Because of Virginia's narrowly defined occupational disease statute6 9
and the court's unwillingness to broaden the act,"° the Industrial Com-
mission is experiencing difficulty in expanding occupational disease cover-
age. Problems in expansion lie primarily in three areas: ordinary diseases,
aggravation of pre-existing conditions, and cumulative injuries.
A. The Exclusion of Ordinary Disease from Compensation
Through adoption of a schedule of coverage for occupational diseases in
1944,71 Virginia expanded its workers' compensation coverage to encom-
pass work-related diseases. Fearing the development of a general health
insurance,7 2 the legislature placed limitations on this coverage.7 3 The
most controversial of these limitations was and still is the ordinary dis-
ease exclusion. Under the Workers' Compensation Act,
[n]o ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside
of the employment shall be compensable, except:
(1) When it follows as an incident of occupational disease as defined in
this title; or
(2) When it is an infectious or contagious disease contracted in the course
of employment in a hospital or sanitarium or public health laboratory.
74
Thus the statute makes it clear that an ordinary disease of life is one to
which the general public is exposed.7 5 The Commission has held that
asthma,76 emphysema,7 7 bronchitis, 7 and arthritis79 are ordinary diseases
fact, Commissioner O'Neill appears to go even further than other Commissioners in favoring
the claimant. No. 106-63-71 (O'Neill, Comm'r, advocating expanding the "incident to occu-
pational disease" exception to include more ordinary diseases). See also infra note 157.
69. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
70. See infra text accompanying note 114.
71. 1944 Va. Acts ch. 77 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980)). Prior to
the 1944 amendments the Act only covered "injuries by accident." See supra notes 23-48
and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
73. Specifically, the disease must "arise out of" the employment and the disease must not
be ordinary. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
74. Id.
75. Id. See also Russell v. Auburn Cent. Mfg., 107 Ind. App. 253, ,22 N.E.2d 889, 890
(1939) (an ordinary disease is a disease common to persons in the ordinary walks of life).
76. Swiggard v. City of Alexandria, 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n 435, 436 (1981).
77. Davis v. Armstrong Cork Co., 48 Op. Indus. v. Comm'n 62, 63 (1966) (compensation
for emphysema denied because medical evidence disclosed that emphysema was an ordinary
disease). But see Williams v. City of Chesapeake, 57 Op. Indus. Comm'n 383, 386 (1976)
(appeal denied) (emphysema held to be compensable occupational disease suffered by
firefighters).
78. Davis, 48 Op Indus. Comm'n at 62 (bronchitis, an uncompensable ordinary disease).
But see Good v. Great A & P Tea Co., 52 Op. Indus. Comm'n 112, 115 (1970) (bronchitis
caused by exposure to "meat wrapping" not an ordinary disease and consequently
compensable).
79. Abbott v. General Elect. Co., 52 Op. Indus. Comm'n 1, 2 (1970).
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of life and therefore not compensable.
Like most states, 0 until 1970 Virginia used a schedule which listed and
defined specific diseases considered to be occupational.81 Under this
schedule, the Industrial Commission had a relatively easy task in deter-
mining whether or not a disease was occupational. First, the Commission
checked the schedule to see if the disease was statutorily classified as an
occupational disease.82 If it was, the Commission then applied the six-
point "arising out of" test.8 3 If it passed this test, compensation was
awarded. If the disease was not listed on the schedule, or if it failed to
satisfy an element of the causative test, compensation was denied.8 4
The Commission never needed to consider ordinary diseases since such
diseases did not appear on the schedule. The result was an easy enforce-
ment of the ordinary disease exclusion85 with only two circumstances
when ordinary disease could be compensated.8
It was not until the repeal of the statutory schedule" that the Indus-
80. See generally 1B A. LARSON, supra note 11, §§ 41.10-41.20.
81. See supra notes 17-18.
82. See Perrin v. Brunswick Corp., 51 Op. Indus. Comm'n 212, 214 (1969), aff'd, 333 F.
Supp. 221 (W.D. Va. 1971) (the Commission checked to see if bronchitis was listed on the
schedule).
83. The law required that even diseases listed in the schedule had to satisfy the "arising
out of" test in order to be considered occupational. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-47 (1950), re-
pealed by 1970 Va. Acts ch. 470. The "arising out of" test, also referred to as the causation
or causative test, requires that a disease must meet the six requirements outlined in the
Code in order to be considered occupational. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980). See
also supra text accompanying note 53.
84. See, e.g., Burner v. Southern Lightweight Aggregate Corp., 31 Op. Indus. Comm'n
239, 242 (1949) (the Workmen's Compensation Act covers only diseases arising under all six
stipulated canons of the causative test, and those diseases mentioned in the schedule).
85. If a disease was ordinary, it did not appear on the schedule; and a disease not on the
schedule could never be compensated.
86. See supra text accompanying note 74. The two exceptions compensating ordinary dis-
eases have rarely been interpreted by the Virginia Supreme Court. See Van Geuder v. Com-
monwealth, 192 Va. 548, 551, 65 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1951) (a nurse's contraction of tuberculosis
did not follow as an incident of occupational disease). Indiana has, however, interpreted the
"incident to occupational disease" exception to mean an ordinary secondary disease, such as
bronchitis, which follows from a primary occupational disease such as inflammation of the
lungs. Chevrolet Muncie Div. v. Hirst, 113 Ind. App. 181, - 46 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1943).
In the past, the Industrial Commission and the Virginia Supreme Court have regularly
refused to interpret the "incident to occupational disease" exception so broadly as to com-
pensate for all ordinary diseases. See Van Geuder, 192 Va. at 551, 65 S.E.2d at 567; see also
Kaufman v. Star Band Co., 56 Op. Indus. Comm'n 190, 192 (1974); Bailey v. Virginian
Limestone Corp., 55 Op. Indus. Comm'n 19, 21 (1973). However, at least one Commissioner
believes that this exception should be construed broadly enough that ordinary diseases may
easily fit into it and be compensated. Yancy v. Holly Farms, No. 106-63-71 (Indus. Comm'n
July 26, 1983), appeal granted, No. 83-1386 (Va. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1984).
87. 1970 Va. Acts ch. 470.
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trial Commission encountered difficulty with the ordinary disease exclu-
sion. Free from the confines of the schedule and left with only the six
requirements defining when a disease "arises out of" the employment,8
the Commission started applying this causative test to all diseases.8 9 This
routine application led to the tracing of ordinary diseases of life to the
claimant's employment, particularly since some ordinary diseases may
also be occupational in nature, 90 and some occupational diseases may be
easily confused with ordinary diseases. 91 As the Commission has recently
discovered, a literal reading of this test can severely hamper claims for
relief."'
The Commission has justified ordinary disease awards by basing them
on an unusual condition or hazard inherent in the work, which exposed
the claimant to a greater risk of contracting the disease.93 The Commis-
88. The 1970 changes to the Act merely repealed the schedule of diseases but left the six-
point "arising out of" test. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
Under the exclusive schedule-type coverage, there was little room for the Commission or
the court to expand occupational disease coverage, even if the illness was obviously occupa-
tional. But when general coverage became prevalent, the Commission was faced with the
difficult task of defining occupational diseases. lB A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 41.40.
89. See, e.g., Sage v. Independence Indus., 53 Op. Indus. Comm'n 322, 324 (1971). Even
though the Commission compensated seemingly ordinary diseases, such as carpel tunnel
syndrome, an inflammation of the wrist commonly resulting from housework, it did so on
the grounds of an inherent employment risk. Frequently repetitive motion required by the
employment provided the hazard. See Robertson v. Westvaco Corp., 53 Op. Indus. Comm'n
309, 311-12 (1971); Taylor v. Taylor, 48 Op. Indus. Comm'n 246, 247 (1966) (carpel tunnel
syndrome compensable as an occupational disease related to the use of a heavy hand tool
over an extended period).
90. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Chesapeake, 57 Op. Indus. Comm'n 383, 386 (1976) (ap-
peal denied) (emphysema, an ordinary disease of life, held to be occupational in nature
because claimant was a firefighter). But see, e.g., Raynes v. Rockingham County School Bd.,
46 Op. Indus. Comm'n 194, 196 (1964) (claimant's contraction of emphysema in his employ-
ment as a school janitor who tended the furnace held to be an ordinary disease of life and
not compensable).
91. For instance, most cancers caused by the workplace are not "medically distinguishable
from non-occupationally induced cancers." Solomons, Workers' Compensation for Occupa-
tional Disease Victims: Federal Standards and Threshold Problems, 41 ALB. L. REv. 195,
199 (1977).
92. Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean, 225 Va. 1, 3, 300 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1983) (per curiam).
93. In these cases, the diseases, although ordinary, were also clearly traceable to the em-
ployment and there was some inherent factor in the employment which exposed the claim-
ant to a greater risk of contracting the disease. See, e.g., Hackler v. Hanes Corp., 60 Op.
Indus. Comm'n 176, 178 (1981) (claimant's tendonitis caused by repetitive motions as a
"closed sleeve machine operator" compensable); Fragale v. Giant of Va., Inc., 53 Op. Indus.
Comm'n 100, 103 (1971) (tendonitis of the shoulder compensable when the claimant was
required to bend and twist her shoulders constantly while operating cash register and pack-
ing groceries); Sage v. Independence Indus., 53 Op. Indus. Comm'n 322, 324 (1971)
(tendonitis of the forearm compensable because of repeated motion involved with work as a
"seamer"); see also Good v. Great A & P Tea Co., 52 Op. Indus. Comm'n 112, 115 (1971)
("meat wrapper's disease," asthmatic bronchitis, held compensable because the general pub-
lic was not exposed to the risk). But cf. Esque v. Giant Food, Inc., 56 Op. Indus. Comm'n
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
sioners have generally agreed that a disease which naturally follows from
an inherent employment hazard and which exposes employees to a
greater risk of contracting the disease is occupational.94 Dissention among
the Commissioners arises, however, when this rule is applied to very com-
mon diseases to which the general public is exposed,95 or when the causa-
tive link is relatively tenuous.96 In these cases some Commissioners re-
treat to the ordinary disease exclusion and deny all compensation.9 7 As a
result, under some circumstances, the Commission grants compensation
to ordinary diseases and at other times denies it.
Repeal of the schedule has forced the Commission to deal with the true
dilemma of the ordinary disease exclusion: Should compensation be
awarded to an ordinary disease to which the general public is exposed if
there is a causal link with the employment; or should the ordinary disease
exclusion preclude such compensation? Ultimately, the Commissioners'
conflicting treatment of ordinary disease compensation has led to
confusion.
B. The Refusal to Compensate an Aggravation of a Pre-existing
Condition
Another obstacle to the expansion of occupational disease coverage has
been the Industrial Commission's consistent refusal to compensate aggra-
vation by the work environment of a pre-existing infirmity unless the ag-
gravation is the result of a specific accident. The Commission has repeat-
104, 105 (1975) ("meat wrapper's disease" not compensable).
Missouri has held, under an occupational disease statute similar to Virginia's, Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 287.067 (Vernon 1965), that an ordinary disease is compensable if it results from an
unusual work condition which exposes the claimant to a greater chance of contracting the
disease. See Collins v. Neevel Luggage Mfg., 481 S.W.2d 548, 555 (Mo. 1972) (claimant com-
pensated for carpel tunnel syndrome); see also Recent Cases, Workmen's Compensation,
Compensation for Occupational Diseases-Application of the Ordinary-Disease-of-Life
Exclusionary Clause of the Missouri Occupational Disease Statute, 38 Mo. L. REv. 705
(1973).
94. For example, even though asthmatic bronchitis is a disease to which the general pub-
lic is exposed, compensation was awarded in one case because the claimant's chances of
contracting the disease were higher than the general public's. Good, 52 Op. Indus. Comm'n
at 115.
95. When the disease is too common, the Commissioners experience difficulty in justifying
the compensation as an occupational disease. See; e.g., Bean v. Ashland Oil Co., No. 100-79-
01 (Indus. Comm'n Jan. 21, 1982), rev'd, 225 Va. 1, 300 S.E.2d 739 (1983) (see infra notes
123-48 and accompanying text); Swiggard v. City of Alexandria, 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n 435,
436 (1981) (claimant has ordinary asthma which is not compensable as an occupational
disease).
96. The Industrial Commission also has difficulty awarding compensation when the cau-
sation is not certain. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Chesapeake, 57 Op. Indus. Comm'n 387,
388 (1976) (dissent finding insufficient link between claimant firefighter's emphysema and
his occupation, when claimant had also smoked for twenty years).
97. See Swiggard, 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n at 436; Esque, 56 Op. Indus. Comm'n at 105.
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edly held that there are no provisions which permit recovery for
aggravation of an ordinary disease."8 The Federal District Court for the
Western District of Virginia has affirmed the Commission's denial of such
compensation."9
Virginia's refusal to treat such aggravation as an occupational disease is
contrary to the position held in most jurisdictions. 0 0 The majority view is
that when distinctive employment hazards act upon a claimant's pre-ex-
isting condition to produce a disease, the result is compensable as an oc-
cupational disease. 10 1
However, the Commission has recently become more inclined to com-
pensate the aggravation of a pre-existing condition.10 2 The Commissioner
most closely identified with this view103 draws an analogy between this
type of aggravation and the aggravation "by accident" of a pre-existing
condition,1 0 4 which is always compensable.100 This new view asserts that
the employer should take the employee as he finds him, with all of his
98. This situation should be distinguished from an aggravation by a work-related accident
of a claimant's pre-existing infirmity. Compensation for the latter type of aggravation is
universally awarded. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. However, when a claim-
ant's pre-existing infirmity is merely aggravated by the work environment, compensation is
denied. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n 192, 195 (1981);
Kaufman v. Star Band Co., 56 Op. Indus. Comm'n 190, 192 (1974); Bailey v. Virginian
Limestone Corp., 55 Op. Indus. Comm'n 19, 21 (1973); Sullins v. Southern States Coop., 49
Op. Indus. Comm'n 315, 316 (1967); Robertson v. Fairfax County School Bd., 48 Op. Indus.
Comm'n 206, 207 (1966); Burner v. Lightweight Aggregate Corp., 31 Op. Indus. Comm'n
239, 242 (1949).
99. Perrin v. Brunswick Corp., 51 Op. Indus. Comm'n 212, 214 (1969), a/I'd, 333 F. Supp.
221, 223 (W.D. Va. 1971).
100. For a general discussion of the majority and minority views, see 1B A. LARSON, supra
note 11, §§ 41.60-41.63.
101. Id., § 41.63. Some jurisdictions award compensation for job-related back strain, even
though the employee already suffered from a congenital back weakness. Buchanan v. Beth-
lehem Steel Co., 278 A.D. 594, _, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 102 (1951) (predisposition to back
injuries held not to bar a finding of occupational disease when claimant became disabled
because of back strain after years of heavy lifting). But cf. Detenbeck v. General Motors
Corp., 309 N.Y. 558, -, 132 N.E.2d 840, 842 (1956) (aggravation of congenital back weak-
ness held not compensable as an occupational disease). Other courts have awarded compen-
sation for the aggravation of fiat feet, Townsend v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 282 A.D. 968,
., 125 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (1953); allergies, LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499,
-, 24 A.2d 253, 256 (1942); and impotency, Stepnowski v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, 18
N.J. Super. 546, -, 87 A.2d 546, 548 (1952).
102. See Hatfield, 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n at 195-96 (1981) (Joyner, Comm'r, dissenting);
see also Irvine v. Reeves Bros., 55 Op. Indus. Comm'n 194, 195 (1973) (Joyner, Comm'r;
compensation awarded for a bronchial condition that was aggravated by the work
environment).
103. Commissioner Joyner is the proponent of the new view which would compensate as
an occupational disease the aggravation, by the work environment, of a claimant's pre-ex-
isting infirmity.
104. Hatfield, 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n at 195-96 (Joyner, Comm'r, dissenting).
105. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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predispositions, weaknesses, and infirmities;"'6 if the employment envi-
ronment aggravates those conditions, the result is an occupational dis-
ease. Nevertheless, this is still a minority view on the Commission.
10 7
C. Difficulty Obtaining Compensation for Cumulative Injuries
The last area of difficulty in broadening the occupational disease cover-
age has been the compensation of cumulative injuries. Cumulative inju-
ries-or, as one authority describes them, "generalized condi-
tions"' 0 5 -are gradually-incurred, work-related conditions. 0 9 The most
prevalent of these are back"0 and heart injuries.""'
The Commission initially denied compensation for back strain resulting
from repeated trauma because back strain was neither an accident nor an
occupational disease." 2 In recent years, a majority of the Commission
came to believe that gradually-developing, work-related back strain
should be compensated under workers' compensation. As a result, the
Commission has awarded compensation under "injury by accident" to
two claimants suffering from work-related back strain."' s However, the
Virginia Supreme Court reversed both cases, holding that an accident
must arise "from an identifiable incident that occurs at some reasonably
definite time."" 4 Consequently, the court blocked any further attempts
by the Commission to compensate cumulative injuries as "injuries by
accident."
106. Hatfield, 60 Op. Indus. Comm'n at 195-96 (Joyner, Comm'r, dissenting).
107. "[I]t is [not] the intention under the Workmen's Compensation Act to treat an ag-
gravation of any ordinary disease of life the same as ... an aggravation of a pre-existing
condition by accident." Bean v. Ashland Oil Co., No. 100-79-01, at 4 (Indus. Comm'n Jan.
21, 1982) (James, Comm'r, dissenting), rev'd, 225 Va. 1, 300 S.E.2d 739 (1983) (per curiam).
108. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 38.30. These injuries do not display the obvious,
sudden mechanical or structural changes in the body that characterize an injury by acci-
dent, but rather result gradually from employment trauma.
109. REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMM. STUDYING THE FEASIBILITY OF COMPENSATING GRADu-
ALLY-INCURRED, WORK-RELATED INJURIES UNDER THE VIRGINIA'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT, H. Doc. No. 20, VIRGINIA GEN. ASSEMBLY 4 (1983) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
110. In 1982, the Virginia Industrial Commission received 10,794 claims regarding back
strain or sprains. This figure represents approximately 25% of the total claims filed. Tele-
phone interview with Ronald Umble, Systems Analyst for the Virginia Industrial Commis-
sion in Richmond, Va. (Oct. 11, 1983).
111. In 1982, 160 claims for heart injuries were filed. Id.
112. Hensley v. Morton Frozen Foods Div., 46 Op. Indus. Comm'n 107, 109 (1964). The
Commission stated that "[i]f back pains due to strain or sprain were construed to be an
occupational disease, the Workmen's Compensation Act would become a health insurance
policy." Id. at 109.
113. Cogbill v. VEPCO, No. 665-734 (Indus. Comm'n Dec. 8, 1980), rev'd, 223 Va. 354,
288 S.E.2d 485 (1982); Starks v. Badische Corp., No. 638-763 (Indus. Comm'n Feb. 28,
1980), rev'd, 221 Va. 910, 275 S.E.2d 605 (1981).
114. Cogbill, 223 Va. at 356, 288 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting Starks, 221 Va. at 912, 275 S.E.2d
at 606).
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Responding to the court's action in these cases, the Virginia General
Assembly appointed a joint House-Senate subcommittee to study the ef-
fects of amending the Virginia Code to compensate gradually-incurred,
work-related injuries.11 Although the subcommittee did not make any
specific recommendations, 18 three bills amending the "injury by acci-
dent" requirement were introduced by individual representatives. 1" 7 All
three were defeated in committee.""
Even though the court refused to compensate back pain as an acciden-
tal injury and the legislature declined to amend the statute, the Industrial
Commission has continued to compensate cumulative injuries." 9 In a case
now pending before the Virginia Supreme Court, 2 0 the Commission com-
pensated back pain as an occupational disease rather than as injury by
accident.' 2 '
III. THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT INTERVENES
For the past decade the Virginia Supreme Court has left the interpreta-
tion of Virginia's occupational disease statute to the Industrial Commis-
sion's discretion. The court has shown considerable deference to the Com-
mission's decisions, as evidenced by the small number of appeals
granted. 2 2 However, with little judicial guidance as to the compensability
115. REPORT, supra note 109.
116. Id. at 7.
117. H.B. 296, Virginia Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1983) (Dels. Richard Cranwell and
Warren Stambaugh, patrons); S.B. 213 Virginia Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1983) (Sen. Jo-
seph Gartlan, patron); S.B. 197, Virginia Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1983) (Sens. Peter
Babalas and Douglas Wilder, patrons).
The consensus of the legislature appears to be that cumulative injuries should be compen-
sated under workers' compensation, but that such compensation should be achieved through
a broader judicial interpretation of the act and not by legislative amendment. Telephone
interview with Delegate Warren G. Stambaugh, Chairman of the Joint Subconiumittee Stud-
ying the Feasibility of Compensating Gradually-Incurred, Work-Related Injuries Under the
Virginia's Workmen's Compensation Act (Sept. 30, 1983). Consequently, there are no plans
to introduce another bill to amend the law until further word is received from the court. Id.
118. Telephone interview with the Virginia General Assembly Legislative Services in
Richmond, Va. (Oct. 13, 1983).
119. The Commission recently compensated a gradually-incurred, work-related back
strain, but this time did so on the grounds of occupational disease rather than "injury by
accident." Yancy v. Holly Farms, No. 106-63-71 (Indus. Comm'n July 26, 1983), appeal
granted, No. 83-1386 (Va. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1984).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. For example, in 1981 the Virginia Industrial Commission issued 876 review opinions,
of which 150 were appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court. The court granted review to
only 14 of those cases. In 1982, the Commission issued 909 review opinions, of which 170
were appealed. The court granted review to only 13 of those cases. Interview with Andrew
Edelstein, Claims Manager, Virginia Industrial Commission, in Richmond, Va. (Sept. 20,
1983).
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of ordinary disease, the Commissioners have relied on their own ideas and
values in shaping this area of workers' compensation. The result has been
a lack of firm standards defining the scope of ordinary disease compen-
sability. Recognizing the present confusion, the court attempted, in Ash-
land Oil Co. v. Bean,12 to clarify the situation.
A. The Court's Attempt to Clarify the Ordinary Disease Exclusion
1. Facts of Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean
The claimant, who had been a waitress for most of her life, accepted a
job as a gas-station attendant for the appellant. She worked alone for six-
or nine-hour shifts, without scheduled breaks, and was constantly on her
feet. As part of her uniform, the claimant was required to wear "'closed
shoes' with hard soles.1 24 After six months of this work, she developed a
foot pain which was later diagnosed as a bunion for which she subse-
quently underwent surgery12' 5 and was unable to return to work. The
medical report indicated that "the time spent on her feet in closed hard
shoes was definitely a factor. . . in her problem. 12 The report also dis-
closed that the claimant had a pre-existing "bump" on her foot, but that
it had never caused her any problems. 12' The claimant sought disability
compensation for an occupational disease.
The Deputy Commissioner, 28 finding that bunions are ordinary dis-
eases of life, denied compensation because the claimant had failed to
carry her burden of proof. 129 On review to the full Commission,2 0 the ma-
jority ignored the finding of an ordinary disease, and instead held that a
sufficient causal connection existed between the injury and the job to
warrant compensation.' 3' The dissenting Commissioner argued that com-
pensation should be denied since the claimant's disease was simply an
123. 225 Va. 1, 300 S.E.2d 739 (1983) (per curiam).
124. Id. at 2, 300 S.E.2d at 739.
125. The claimant underwent an unsuccessful bunionectomy on the left foot and a
"wedge osteotomy 1st metatarsal." Id. at 2, 300 S.E.2d at 739.
126. Id. at 3, 300 S.E.2d at 739.
127. Id.
128. A de novo hearing on the claim was held in Alexandria, Va., because of the failure to
preserve the record of a previous hearing held on July 23, 1981. No. 100-79-01 (Indus.
Comm'n Sept. 24, 1981) (MacBeth Comm'r).
129. Deputy Commissioner MacBeth found an insufficient causal connection between the
claimant's employment and her development of bunions. According to the opinion, the sixth
statutory requirement, a risk connected with this employment that would lead to bunions,
was not identified. No. 100-79-01 at 4.
130. No. 100-79-01 (Indus. Comm'n Jan. 21, 1982) (Joyner, Comm'r).
131. The majority held that "the claimant's disability sufficiently meets the requirements
of § 65.1-46. Specifically we find that the claimant's pre-existing condition was aggravated
by her work to the point that it became disabling .... No. 100-79-01 at 2.
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aggravation of a pre-existing condition.132
2. The Court's Findings
The Virginia Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the In-
dustrial Commission's compensation award.13 3 The court based its deci-
sion on several different and seemingly conflicting theories. First, it found
that the claimant's disease did not arise out of her employment because
the bunion's origin antedated her employment. 13 The court also stated
that the claim was not compensable because bunions are an ordinary dis-
ease of life to which the general public is exposed,13 5 and that because the
claim did not fit into either of the two exceptions to the ordinary disease
exclusion, compensation should be denied.
1 36
In its last finding, the court reversed the award because of the existence
of the claimant's pre-existing "bump.' 1 37 The court found that the prior
condition was merely aggravated by the work environment and, under the
Workers' Compensation Act, was not compensable as an occupational
disease.
38
3. Analysis of the Court's Findings
Three holdings emerge from the Virginia Supreme Court's analysis in
Bean: (1) ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed
are compensable so long as the six requirements of the "arising out of"
test are met; (2) ordinary diseases of life are not compensable unless they
fall within the two enumerated exceptions; and (3) aggravations of a pre-
existing condition by the work environment are not compensable as occu-
pational diseases.
The first finding, that the disease did not arise out of the employment,
suggests that the court has adopted the expansive view of occupational
diseases."39 This view applies the six-point causative test to all diseases to
determine whether they are occupational. In Bean, the sixth requirement,
that an occupational disease "must appear to have had its origin in a risk
connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a
132. Since the claimant's bunion pre-existed her employment, Commissioner James
would have affirmed the initial denial of compensation as an aggravation of a pre-existing
disease. No. 100-79-01 at 3-4 (James, Comm'r, dissenting).
133. 225 Va. 1, 3, 300 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1983).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 3-4, 300 S.E.2d at 740.
136. The court specifically found the two exceptions to ordinary disease exclusion inappli-
cable here. Id. at 3, 300 S.E.2d at 740.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See infra note 148.
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natural consequence.. .,- 140 was not satisfied. Compensation was denied
because the bunion's origin antedated the claimant's employment. This
reasoning makes it appear that the court intended to apply the six-point
test to all ordinary diseases; otherwise, there was no need to determine
that the sixth requirement was not fulfilled. This language suggests that
diseases, even ordinary ones, would be compensable as occupational dis-
eases so long as the six requirements of the "arising out of" test are met.
The court's second finding seems directly to contradict the first. The
court expressly ruled that compensation should be denied for an ordinary
disease unless the disease falls within one of the two enumerated excep-
tions:1 4 1 Either the ordinary disease must follow as an incident of an oc-
cupational disease, or it must be an infectious disease contracted in the
course of employment in a hospital. 4 ' Quoting the statute, the court ex-
plicitly denied compensation for ordinary diseases of life to which the
general public is exposed. 43 This approach is the more conservative and
traditional view,1 4 which denies compensation for all ordinary diseases
regardless of their causal connection to the employment. Under the
court's reasoning in this second holding, it would be virtually impossible
for a claimant to receive compensation for a disease to which the general
public is prone.
In its third finding, the court indicates that the mere fact of the claim-
ant's pre-existing "bump" made compensation improper. 45 The court
here embraced the dissenting Commissioner's position 46 and denied com-
pensation for a pre-existing condition which is aggravated by the work
environment. This position is supported by both Commission and court
decisions.1 47 Consequently, this third holding suggests that the crucial is-
sue in ordinary disease compensation is whether or not the claimant's dis-
ease resulted from aggravation of a pre-existing condition. If a claimant
has a pre-existing infirmity which is aggravated by the employment, as in
Bean, then compensation is denied.
Although the court intended to clarify the status of ordinary disease
compensation, the Bean decision instead compounded the confusion. Af-
ter Bean, either of the differing interpretations1 48 of the ordinary disease
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
141. 225 Va. at 3, 300 S.E.2d at 740.
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
143. 225 Va. at 3-4, 300 S.E.2d at 740.
144. See infra note 148.
145. 225 Va. at 3, 300 S.E.2d at 740.
146. See supra note 132.
147. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
148. These two views are exemplified by the positions of Commissioner James and Com-
missioner Joyner. Commissioner Joyner advocates the expansive view of ordinary disease
compensation, under which all ordinary diseases should be compensable as occupational dis-
eases so long as they meet the six requirements of the "arising out of" test and are therefore
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exclusion can find judicial support. The expansive view can rely on the
court's first finding, which traces the disease back to the employment and
applies the six-point causation test, to justify compensation. The con-
servative sector may simply look to the court's reaffirmation of the ordi-
nary disease exclusion, in the second finding, to deny compensation.
B. The Court's Second Chance to Clarify the Ordinary Disease
Exclusion
The Virginia Supreme Court will have another opportunity to define
the parameters of the ordinary disease exclusion and to clarify the hold-
ings in Bean. On July 26, 1983, the Industrial Commission once again
awarded compensation to an ordinary disease of life in Yancy v. Holly
Farms.4 9 An appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was filed, and the
court has granted review.150
In Yancy, the claimant, a poultry inspector, sustained back strain from
the repetitive twisting motions related to her work. 5' She asserted both
"injury by accident" and occupational disease as grounds for compensa-
tion.152 The Commission, following Virginia Supreme Court decisions,
53
denied compensation on the "injury by accident" claim,'5' but nonethe-
less awarded compensation on the grounds of occupational disease, even
though back strain is an ordinary disease of life. Since the majority found
all six elements of the causative test to be satisfied, compensation was
causally related to the employment. See, e.g., Bean v. Ashland Oil Co., No. 100-79-01 (In-
dus. Comm'n Jan. 21, 1982). Commissioner James, on the other hand, advocates the more
conservative approach. Under this view, no ordinary diseases of life are compensable unless
they fall within one of the two enumerated statutory exceptions. See, e.g., Yancy v. Holly
Farms, No. 106-63-71 (Indus. Comm'n July 26, 1983) (James, Comm'r, dissenting).
149. No. 106-63-71 (Indus. Comm'n July 26, 1983), appeal granted, No. 83-1386 (Va. Sup.
Ct. May 25, 1984).
Not only is Yancy important for the clarification of the ordinary disease exclusion, but it
may also be a pivotal decision in the compensation of cumulative injuries. See supra notes
119-21 and accompanying text. Since the court has already refused to treat cumulative inju-
ries as accidents, see supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text, the only remaining possi-
bility for compensation is to treat such injuries as occupational diseases. Yancy should de-
termine whether or not cumulative injuries can be compensated under Virginia's existing
Workers' Compensation Act.
150. Interview with Andrew Edestein, Claims Manager, Virginia Industrial Commission,
in Richmond, Va. (Sept. 20, 1983).
151. The claimant was required to move packages of chicken, each weighing approxi-
mately five pounds, from her work station to a rack. In so doing, she had to turn her body to
the left and then to the right. The claimant then had to move the racks, which weighed
about 40 pounds, onto a conveyor belt. In an average eight-hour shift, the claimant was
required to twist her body from 4,000-4,800 times. No. 106-63-71 at 1-2.
152. Id.
153. See cases cited supra note 113.
154. No. 106-63-71 at 4.
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awarded.'55
The Industrial Commission seems to have interpreted the court's first
and third holdings in Bean in conjunction with each other. 156 This read-
ing results in compensation for ordinary diseases as long as they are, first,




The dissenting Commissioner argued that once it is found that an em-
ployee's disease is ordinary and that it does not fit either exception, com-
pensation must be denied. s5 He added that the six requirements of the
"arising out of" test should not even be considered once the disease is
initially determined to be ordinary.
59
The court's ruling in Yancy may clarify the Bean decision and establish
a definitive rule applicable to ordinary diseases. Since the court in Yancy
has only two alternatives, denying or affirming the award of compensa-
tion, it will almost certainly follow one or the other of the Bean holdings.
The court may deny compensation on the basis of the ordinary disease
exclusion, thereby upholding the second rule in Bean.60 The court could
find that back pain, which is an ordinary disease of life to which the gen-
eral public is exposed, is excludable under the Code. By denying compen-
sation, the court would essentially be upholding the traditional approach.
As a result, compensation for all ordinary diseases of life would be denied,
unless one of the two exceptions apply.
On the other hand, the court may affirm the award on the basis of the
"arising out of" test, thus following the first holding in Bean.'' The court
155. Id. at 7-8. See supra text accompanying note 53.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
157. Writing for the majority in Yancy, Commissioner O'Neill states that an ordinary
disease fits into the "incident to occupational disease" exception by fulfilling the six statu-
tory requirements of the "arising out of" test. No. 106-63-71 at 4-5. This position had never
before been advanced by the Commission and was strongly objected to in the dissent. Id. at
10 (James, Comm'r, dissenting).
This new justification for compensating an ordinary disease of life by fitting it into the
"incident to occupational disease" exception will not, in all probability, be favorably re-
ceived by the Virginia Supreme Court. See Van Geuder v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 548, 65
S.E.2d 565 (1951) (narrowly interpreting the "incident to occupational disease" exception).
This prediction is supported by the court's decision in Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean, 225 Va. 1, 3-
4, 300 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1983) (per curiam). See also supra note 86 (concerning the Commis-
sion's previous treatment of these two ordinary disease exceptions).
158. Yancy, No. 106-63-71, at 9-11 (James, Comm'r, dissenting).
159. Id. at 10.
160. The second holding in Bean denied compensation to all ordinary diseases of life
which did not fall within one of the two exceptions. See supra text accompanying note 141.
161. The first holding in Bean granted compensation to all ordinary diseases of life so




could find the back pain causally related to the employment if the facts
satisfy the six causation requirements. By affirming the award, the court
would be supporting the expansive view of disease compensation. This
approach could result in compensation for all ordinary diseases of life, as
long as they are traceable to the employment.
The Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Yancy will almost inevitably
have to follow one of its three findings in Bean.162 In doing so, the court
will perhaps clarify its earlier decision and provide a clear answer to the
question of ordinary disease compensability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ordinary disease compensation has been in a state of uncertainty and
fluctuation for the past decade. The repeal of the schedule-type coverage,
the ambiguity of the ordinary disease exclusion, and the Commission's
desire to expand compensation have resulted in conflicting treatment of
ordinary diseases. The Virginia Supreme Court's effort to clarify the law
in Bean has proved fruitless, because the court provided three conflicting
rules of law rather than a single clear standard which could be applied to
ordinary diseases.
The Yancy appeal presents the court with another opportunity to re-
solve this confusion. Either ordinary diseases will be compensable under
the "arising out of" test, or they will not be compensable under the
Code's exclusion clause. The importance of Yancy is that the court has
the opportunity to articulate a uniform standard for all ordinary diseases.
If the Industrial Commission's conflicting interpretations of the statute
are to be resolved, the court must take the responsibility for setting forth
a rule which the Commission can consistently apply to ordinary diseases.
Absent this court guidance, the decision to compensate ordinary diseases
will remain with the Commission, and the contradictory treatment of or-
dinary diseases may continue.16
3
At present,'6 ordinary diseases may be compensable if they are caus-
ally traced to the employment; in other cases, because of the exclusionary
clause, they are not. Until the court intervenes and articulates a standard
162. The third holding in Bean is inapplicable to Yancy since there is no evidence in the
record that the claimant's back injury resulted from aggravation of a pre-existing condition.
163. The legislature could intervene and amend § 65.1-46 of the Virginia Code to obtain a
uniform treatment of ordinary diseases. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
However, this intervention is unlikely since the prevailing attitude of the legislature is that
such changes should come from the court and not from the General Assembly. See supra
note 117.
164. Although it is still too early to reach a firm conclusion, it appears that Commissioner
O'Neill's appointment to the Industrial Commission has provided the vote needed to make a
majority favoring compensability of ordinary diseases. See supra note 68.
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by which to gauge the compensability of ordinary diseases, confusion will
continue to prevail.
Teri Scott Lovelace
